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MASSACHUSETfS LAW-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ExPAt"J
SION OF EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY TO SPOUSES AND CHILDREN OF

EMPLOYEES--Fen'iter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc.,
1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2075, 413 N.E.2d 690.
INJURED

1.

INTRODUCTION

Workmen's compensation is a system of social insurance that
exists by law in every state. Under this scheme, employees are
compensated for work-related injuries without proving negligence
or fault and without resorting to the courts. The system benefits
everyone concerned. Society benefits because injured employees
who cannot successfully sue their employers do not have to be
come wards or dependents of the state. Employers enjoy limited,
statutorily determined liability and immunity from "all claims or
demands at law, if any, arising from the injury."!
In Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc. 2 the Massachu
setts Supreme Judicial Court seriously disturbed this equilibrium
by allowing an injured employee's dependents to sue his employer
for loss of consortium and society and for negligently inflicted
mental distress. 3 As a result, Massachusetts employers no longer
are immune from all common-law actions, contrary to the intent
of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act (the Act).4
Ferriter not only disturbed workmen's compensation law; it
also changed the nature of tort law recovery for the children and
spouses of injured people. The court granted the employee's chil
. dren the right to sue for loss of parental consortium, a right which
pr~viously had not existed in any jurisdiction. 5 The court also held
1. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 23 (West 1958).
2. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2075, 413 N.E.2d 690.
3. Id.
4. "If an employee files any claim for, or accepts payment of, compensation ...
such action shall constitute a release to the insured . .. of all claims or demands at
[aw, if any, arising from the injury." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 23 (West
1958) (emphasis added).
5. The \1assachusetts Supreme Judicial Court is the first court of last resort of
any state to recognize this right. 1980 \·Iass. Adv. Sh. at 2111, 413 N.E.2d at 710. The
intermediate appellate court of only o~e other state has recognized a child's right to
sue for loss of consortium. See Berger v. Weher, 82 \1ich. App. 199,267 N.W.2d 124
(1978). The claim of a right to sue on this ground was IIrst made and denied in
Massachusetts in Nelson v. Richwagon, 326 1\·lass. 485, 95 N.E.2d .54,5 (19.50).
At common law, a child was held not t~ have a vested legal right to parental so
ciety. 1980 \olass. Adv. Sh. at 20Rl, 413 N.E.2d at 694. See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF
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that emotional distress suffered by a third party as a result of an
other's injury is compensable even if the third party neither
witnessed the accident nor rushed to the scene of the accident. 6
Although thorough analysis of the tort issues is beyond the scope of
this note, their impact on workmen's compensation will be ex
plored. 7
This note will focus on the workmen's compensation aspect of
Feniter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 8 particularly on section 24
of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act. 9 Section 24,
TORTS § 125, at 896-97 (4th ed. 1971). Courts refused to recognize the right for a va
riety of reasons including lack of precedent, fear of a multiplicity of suits, fear of
double recovery, and difficulty in determining damages. Id. See generally Note, In
terference with Family Relation: Right of a Child to Parental Care: Scruggs v.
Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii 1955),42 CORNELL L. REV. 115 (1956). The
Ferriter court commented that children's rights are increasingly being recognized, as
evidenced by the large number of commentaries and a Massachusetts statute on the
subject. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 229, § 2(1) (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
The court held that children have a viable claim for loss of parental consortium. 1980
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2801-85, 413 N.E.2d at 694-96.
6. Fear of fraud and unlimited liability in the past discouraged recognition of
claims for emotional distress. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5 § 54, at 329. Courts,
however, began to allow emotional distress actions as long as they were ac
companied by physical injury. See Battalia v. New York, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d
729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096
(1976). The first Massachusetts case to allow recovery for emotional distress was
George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971).
Actions for emotional distress arising from harm to another were even less
popular because of the greater possibility of fraud and unlimited liability. See gener
ally 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 18.4, at 1031-39 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra
note 5, § 55, at 333-34. To prevent unlimited liability, courts imposed arbitrary limits
on the family members who could recover. See generally Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d
728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (creating the zone of danger stand.ard);
Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969) (re
jecting the arbitrary limits of Dillon, but denying the action on policy grounds).
Massachusetts first recognized emotional distress arising from harm to another in
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978). In the Dziokonski
decision, a mother died from physical injuries that arose from the emotional distress
that she suffered while rushing to the scene of the accident where her child was in
jured. The court allowed her estate to recover, stating that fear of fraudulent suits
was not a reason for denying someone a valid cause of action. Id. at 565, 380 N.E.2d
at 1301. The court also stated that legal principles, not arbitrary lines, should dictate
whether or not recovery is to be had. [d. By allowing recovery for emotional distress,
the Ferriter court similarly relied on principles of proximity and refused to apply any
arbitrary limits. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2086-87, 413 N.E.2d at 696-97.
7. See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
8. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2075,413 N.E.2d at 690.
9. "An employee shall be held to have waived his right of action at common
law . . . to recover damages for personal injuries if he Shall not have given his
employer, at the time of his contract of hire, written notice that he claimed such
right...." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 24 (West 1958).
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known as the exclusivity clause, provides that the statutory remedy
is exclusive unless the employee has elected to retain his COl:nmon
law rights against the employer,10 The court's interpretation of this
section will be analyzed in light of the history and purpose of the
compensation system and the treatment this issue has received in·
other jurisdictions, This note will demonstrate how the court erred
in its decision by failing to grasp the legislative intent behind the
compensation system, The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,
by disregarding the policies underlying the Act, amended. the
Workmen's Compensation Act and imposed liability where none
was intended.
II.

A.

FERRITER

v.

O'CONNELL'

Facts

On May 18, 1979, Michael Ferriter was seriously injured
when a load of wooden beams fell from a hoisted nylon sling and
struck him on the neck. Ferriter and all the individuals at the
scene of the accident were employed by defendant, Daniel
O'Connell's Sons, Inc. As a result of the accident, Ferriter was par
alyzed from the neck down. Pursuant to sections 34 and 34A of
the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act,l1 Ferriter was
awarded payments of $211 per week for as long as he remained in
capacitated.
On June 7, 1979, Ferriter's wife and children instituted an ac
tion -against O'Connell. They alleged that O'Connell's willful and
wanton recklessness was the cause of Ferriter's accident. Plaintiffs
further alleged that they suffered the loss of Ferriter's consortium
and society as the result of the accident. Plaintiffs prayed for dam
ages for the emotional and physical distress they suffered from see
ing Ferriter at the hospital in his injured condition.
At trial defendant moved for summary judgment,12 asserting
that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
10. For the employer, however, the act is compulsory. See id. § 1(4) (1958 &
West. Cum. Supp. 1981).
11. "While the incapacity for work resulting from an injury is total, the insurer
shall pay the injured employee ... compensation equal to two-thirds of his average
weekly wage . . . ." Id. § 34. Section 34A of the Work~en's Compensation Act pro
vides that "[ w]hile the incapacity ... is both permanent and total, the insurer shall
pay [the benefits prescribed in § 34] during the continuance of such permanent and
total incapacity." [d. § 34A.
12. MASS. R. CIV. P. 56.
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be granted. Defendant argued that the children's claims for loss of
consortium and the children's and wife's claims for emotional dis
tress were not valid since the Workmen's Compensation Act barred
actions at common law. 13
The trial judge granted defendant's request for summary judg
ment on the emotional distress claim but denied it for the loss of
consortium and society claims. Plaintiffs appealed, and the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate
review. 14
In a lengthy, four-to-three decision, the court affirmed in part
and reversed in part. Justice Liacos, writing for the majority,
stated that a child has an enforceable legal right to parental consor
tium. 15 The court also reversed the summary judgment on the
emotional distress claim. 1s Most importantly, however, the court
stated that the exclusivity clause of the Massachusetts Workmen's
Compensation Act,17 which makes the provisions of the Act the ex
clusive remedy in work-related injuries, does not immunize an em
ployer against suits by an employee's dependents. 18 The court rea
soned that loss of consortium and emotional distress actions are not
barred because they are independent of the employee's injury and
thus are unaffected by the Workmen's Compensation Act.

B.

Rationale

Section 24 of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act
states that an employee waives all common-law causes of action un
less he expressly notifies his employer when he commences em
ployment that he intends to retain them. 19 If the employee fails to
reserve those rights or if he accepts compensation under the Act,
he is barred from suing his employer at common law. 20 Ferriter
has upset this statutory scheme: employers are now subject to ad
ditional liability. In Ferriter the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court decided that section 24 gives employees full protection in
the event of injury but does not guarantee employers limited liabil
ity even if they comply with the Act. The employer is not pro
13. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2076-77,413 N.E.2d at 692.
14. MASS. R. Cry. P. 64.
15. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2083, 413 N.E.2d at 695.
16. Id. at 2087, 413 N.E.2d at 697.
17. See note 9 supra.
18. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2098,413 N.E.2d at 703.
19. See note 9 supra.
20. See note 1 supra.
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tected against suits by the employee's dependents even though the
employee receives workmen's compensation benefits.
The Ferriter court's entire opinion was based on the narrow
wording of the Act's exclusivity clause21 and on King v. Viscoloid
CO.,22 decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in
1914. King involved an action by the mother of an injured minor
employee for loss of the child's services. 23 The court held that the
child's waiver of his common-law rights under the exclusivity
clause and his acceptance of benefits under the Act did not operate
as a waiver of his mother's rights. 24 It was held, therefore, that the
mother had a cause of action against the employer.25 Defendant in
Ferriter argued that King had been overruled implicitly by a 1945
statutory provision26 which provided added compensation for de
pendents and parents of employees. 27 The Ferriter court replied
that the Massachusetts legislature had not demonstrated an intent to
overrule King 28 and, further, that section 35A was silent regarding
limitations on common-law rights. 29
Defendant also contended that by allowing dependents of in
jured employees to bring suit the court reintroduced fault into the
system, something that workmen's compensation was supposed
to eliminate. 3o The court, relying steadfastly on King, answered
that fault apparently had never been purged entirely from the
Massachusetts system. 31

21.
22.
23.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 24 (West 1958). See note 9 supra.
219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914).
The employer was insured as required by the act. Id. at 422, 106 N.E. at

988.
24. Id. A common-law right will not be held to have been repealed unless that
intent is clearly expressed in a statute. Pineo v. White, 320 Mass. 487, 491, 70 N.E.2d
294,297 (1946). See generally B. & O. R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893) (legislature
has power to legislate and change or repeal the common law).
25. See note 79 infra. See also Zarba v. Lane, 322 Mass. 132, 76 N.E.2d 318
(1947); Slavin sky v. National Bottling Torah Co., 267 Mass. 319, 166 N.E. 821 (1929).
Both cases support King in dicta but do not reach the same result.
26. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2094-95, 413 N.E.2d at 707. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 152, § 35A (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
27. Ferriter's dependents were eligible under § 35A but could not receive any
thing in this case because Ferriter's benefits exceeded $150. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 152, § 35A (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
28. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2095,413 N.E.2d at 701-02.
29. Id. at 2095, n.27, 413 N.E.2d at 702 n.27.
30. Id. at 2092, 413 N.E.2d at 700.
31. Id. at 2092, 413 N.E.2d at 700. The court went on to say "[t]his is the leg
acy of ... our unusual statute ... whose language unambiguously limits the scope of
the employee's waiver." Id. at 2092-93, 413 N.E.2d at 700.

508

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:503

Defendant's final challenge was that allowing injured employ
ees' dependents to sue for loss of consortium would create an
anomaly: dependents of injured workers would be allowed to re
cover while dependents of deceased workers would remain barred
statutorily from recovery.32 The court, however, saw no inconsist
ency in this result, indicating that it was reasonable for the legisla
ture to have set up a scheme granting the more certain remedy of
workmen's compensation to dependents of deceased employees33
while requiring dependents of surviving employees to litigate the
issue of fault and prevail over employers'common-law defenses in
order to recover for loss of consortium. 34
In conclusion, the court reiterated that the rule in King gov
erned Ferriter and that section 24 of the Workmen's Compensa
tion Act did not bar third-party claims 35 against employers.36
32. Id. at 2096, 413 N.E.2d at 702. The Massachusetts Workmen's Compensa
tion statute acts to bar wrongful death actions in work related deaths. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, §§ 1(4),68 (1958 & West Cum. Supp. 1981)..
At common law, there was no action for wrongful death. The right was first cre
ated by statute in 1847 in New York. 1847 N.Y. LAWS, ch. 450. Massachusetts en
acted a wrongful death statute in 188l. 1881 MASS. ACTS ch. 199.
When an employee dies, a wrongful death action is barred because the employ
ee's dependents are included in the definition of "employee" under MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 1(4) (1958 & West Cum. Supp. 1981). This, however, does not
mean that actions for emotional distress by a deceased employee's dependents will
be barred. The Ferriter court held actions for emotional distress to be independent
of the injury to the employee and of the compensation act. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at
2098,413 N.E.2d at 703. Loss of consortium actions similarly might not be barred if
the employee dies, because they too are considered to be independent actions. Id. at
2097,413 N.E.2d at 702. The latter situation will depend on future developments in
Massachusetts tort law. One state, Georgia, has held that if an injured spouse dies,
the action for loss of consortium is limited to losses sustained from the time of the
injury to the time of death. Walden v. Coleman, 105 Ga. App. 242, 124 S.E.2d 313
(1962).
33. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2097,413 N.E.2d at 702. See note 32 supra.
34. Id. But see notes 71-78 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
possibility that the wording of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, §§ 66 & 67 (1958 &
West Cum. Supp. 1981) may eliminate the employer's common-law defenses in ac
tions by third parties.
35. Id. at 2097-98, 413 N.E.2d at 703-04. O'Connell also claimed that the su
preme judicial court itself, in Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d
555 (1973), held that consortium actions are derivative and hence stand or fall with
the underlying claim. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2097 n.29, 413 N.E.2d at 703 n.29. For
instance, if the injured spouse was contributorily negligent, a loss of consortium ac
tion would be barred. The court summarily disposed of this point by saying that
King and its progeny show that in such actions the defenses of workmen's compensa
tion and contributory negligence are not treated alike. Id. 413 N.E.2d at 703 n.29.
36. No case since 1914 has reached the same result as King. See note 79 infra.
The claims for emotional distress were held to be on the same footing as the claims
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BACKGROUND

Workmen's compensation statutes came into existence in the
early 1900's because of the inadequacy of the existing tort law sys
tem. The statutes were designed to provide a remedy for employ
ees who, because of the rapid expansion of industry, were being
injured with far greater frequency than preindustrial revolution
employees. 37
Until the adoption of workmen's compensation, injured em
ployees were forced to bring tort actions against their employers.
These actions greatly favored the employers in terms of duties and
defenses. At common law the employer's only duties were to pro
vide a reasonably safe place to work, to supply tools, to provide a
sufficient number of fellow workers, to warn of any latent defects,
and to promulgate safety rules. 38 In order to receive compensation
when he was hurt, the employee had to prove that the employer
breached one of these duties. The employee also had to overcome
the employer's three main common-law defenses: Assumption of
the risk by the employee; contributory negligence by the em
.ployee; and negligence by a fellow servant. 39 Another obstacle an
injured employee had to overcome was the cost of litigation.
Finally, since there were few unions to protect employees, there
was nothing to stop an employer from firing an employee who
dared to file suit.
Society, as well as employees, suffered under this system. Dis
abled workers were unable to support themselves and their fami
lies. The only alternative to letting these people starve was for the
government to provide some sort of charity.40 This resulted not
only in a loss of dignity but in an unfair burden on government as
well.
Workmen's compensation statutes were enacted to remedy
this situation. The system was not intended to be insurance against

for loss of consortium and, similarly, were not barred. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2098,
413 N.E.2d at 703.
37. See generally A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW §§ 4.00-5.30
(1978); w. PROSSER, supra note 5, at § 80; 1 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPEN
SATION TEXT §§ 1-11 (3d ed. 1970).
38. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80, at 526.
39. A. LARSON, supra note 37, § 4.30, at 25-27. The fellow servant rule was an
absolute defense for employers sued by employees who were injured by fellow
workers. It provided that employers were not liable for injuries caused by the negli
gence of fellow servants. W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80, at 528.
40. A. LARSON, supra note 37, § 2.20, at 5-7.
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industrial accidents. Rather, workmen's compensation was viewed
as a new theory of liability and relief separate from the common
law: 41 compensation for injured employees was to be treated as a
cost of doing business. 42 The compensation system is not based on
fault but on the existence of an employment relationship.43 The
only requirement for compensation is that the injury arise out of
and in the course of employment. 44 Workmen's compensation,
therefore, can be characterized as a kind of strict liability against
the employer. In accepting this assured but limited compensation,
however, the employee has to relinquish his right to sue his em
ployer at common law. 45
41. "'The cost of the product should bear the blood of the workmen: " See W.
PROSSER, supra note 5, at 530 (attributing quote to Lloyd George). The employer
could, therefore, treat workmen's compensation as an integral cost of business be
cause the recoveries were statutorily fixed and not subject to the whim of juries. See,
e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 34 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). Workmen's com
pensation can, therefore, be characterized as a benefit to the employer as well as to
the employee. W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 37, at §§ 3-4. See Smither & Co. v. Coles,
242 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
42. W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 37, at §§ 4-6. See Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242
F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Meyers v. Buchman, 7 Ill. App. 2d 385, 397-98, 129
N.E.2d 603, 609-10 (1955); Young V. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N.E. 1, 7
(1914); United States Cas. Co. v. Hercules Po. Co., 4 N.J. 157, 165-68, 72 A.2d 190,
195-96 (1950); Reeves v. Parker-Graham-Sexton, Inc., 199 N.C. 236, 239-41, 154 S.E.
66, 67-68 (1930).
43. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 423 (1923); Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 86 Cal. App. 2d 726, 728, 195 P.2d 919, 920-21
(1948); Bourgeois v. J.W. Crawford Constr. Co., 213 La. 991, 998, 36 So. 2d 13, 15
(1948); Sackolowitz v. Charles Hamburg Co., 295 N.Y. 264, 268, 67 N.E.2d 152,
153-54 (1946).
44. This phrase has been given very liberal construction by state courts. See A.
LARSON, supra note 37, at §§ 6.00-19.63. For examples of how far courts have been
willing to go to bring an accident within this requirement, see Laines v. Workmen's
Compensation Appeals Bd., 48 Cal. App. 3d 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 139 (1975) (employee
was injured while on way to doctor to receive treatment for a previous work related
injury); Newell v. Moreau,94 N.H. 439, 55 A.2d 476 (1947) (employee was fatally in
jured in a fight on the job in which he was the aggressor); In re Bletter v. Harcourt,
Brace & World, Inc., 30 App. Div. 2d 601, 290 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1968), aff'd without
opinion, 25 N.Y.2d 755, 250 N.E.2d 572, 303 N.Y.S.2d 510 (1969) (employee so
happy with his job that he did a dance step in the elevator, fell, and was injured);
Chandler v. Industrial Comm'n, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020 (1919) (employee bitten by
a dog on his way to work).
45. 2A A. LARSON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 65.10, at 12-1-12-4
(1976); W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 80, at 531. Part of the workmen's compensation
compromise was that the employee gave up his common-law rights for the limited
but definite statutory remedy and the employer gave up his common-law defenses in
exchange for liability that was both limited and predetermined. The benefits were
not to compensate for loss of wages or earnings but rather to compensate for loss of
earning power. Thus, the employee and his family would not become burdens to so
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Workmen's compensation is fairer, more stable, and more effi
cient than the common-law tort system. Employers, employees,
and society all benefit. Through its strict but limited liability,
workmen's compensation assures relief to injured employees and
protects employers from exorbitant jury verdicts. Further, it allows
the employer to treat compensation costs as a cost of doing busi
ness that can be passed on to the consuming public. 46 Keeping
the employee and his employer out of the courtroom, however,
stands out as one of its most important functions. 47 Another key el
ement of workmen's compensation is the exclusiveness of its rem
edy. Once the employer-employee relationship is established, the
compensation scheme's provisions are to control exclusively.48
Ferriter's· disruption of this aspect of workmen's compensation is
particularly disturbing.

IV.

ANALYSIS

Section 24 of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act_
does not mention third-party actions. The Ferriter court thus was
faced with the task of interpreting an ambiguous statutory section.
If a statute's language is clear and unequivocal, its effect will be
obvious. 49 If the language is not clear, it is the duty of the courts
to interpret and apply the statute. 50 Prior use of terms,51 historic
development of the law involved,52 and the mischief sought to be
remedied53 are factors a court should consider. The court should
try to focus on the intent and purpose of the legislature in passing
the particular statute.
ciety. W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 37, § 3, at 8. Initially, the courts were concerned
that compulsory compensation statutes were unconstitutional. (See Ives v. South Buf
falo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), a case which held a workmen's com
pensation statute unconstitutional.) To avoid this problem, most of the early statutes
were made elective rather than compulsory. A. LARSON, supra note 37, § 5.10, at
37-38. The Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act is no longer elective for the
employer, except in a few limited circumstances. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
152, § 1(4) (1958 & West Cum. Supp. 1981). For the employee, however, it remains
elective. [d. § 24.
46. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
47. A. LARSON, supra note 37, at §§ 2.00-2.70, W. SCHNEIDER, supra note 37, at

§4.
48. See note 42 supra and accompanying text.
49. Binns v. Lawrence, 53 U.S. 9, 17-18 (1851).
50. Morgane v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970).
51. Moore v. United States, 91 U.S. 270, 274 (1875).
52. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653-54 (1897); Pereira v.
New England LNG Co., Inc., 364 Mass. 109, 115-16, 301 N.E.2d 441, 445-46 (1973).
53. Ferullo's Case, 331 Mass. 635, 637, 121 N.E.2d 858, 859 (1954).
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The court rejected defendant's argument that section 24 must
. be read in accordance with the broad purpose of the Act. 54 It in
stead opted for a literal interpretation of the Act's exclusivity
clause. Since the Act did not bar actions for emotional distress and
loss of consortium, the court reasoned that such actions must be al
10wed. 55 Judge Learned Hand once said that "[t]here is no surer
way to misread any document than to read it literally . . . . "56 This
is precisely what the court did in Ferriter. The court overlooked
the objectives sought by workmen's compensation: To do away
with all work-related torts; and to protect both employers and em
ployees. 57 By narrowly construing the Act's language the court
failed to grasp the true purpose of the compensation scheme. 58
The substantive question presented by Ferriter was the extent
of protection employers were to receive under the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had
interpreted the same act in the 1914 case of King v. Viscoloid
Co. 59 and held that third-party suits are permissible. The court ap
parently was of the opinion that employers were not meant to have
absolute immunity from suits at common law. The King court
relied heavily on the maxim that an existing common-law right can
not be waived or abrogated by statute unless the statute clearly ex
presses that intent. 60 Since the employee in King waived only his
rights under the Act, his mother's right to sue for loss of services
was not barred. 61 The Ferriter court, relying on King, followed the
same reasoning and held that suits by Ferriter's dependents were
not barred because they had not been waived explicity. 62

54. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2092-94, 413 N.E.2d at 700-01. See text accompa
nying notes 30-32 supra.
55. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2093-94, 413 N.E.2d at 700-01.
56. Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (concurring opinion).
57. Workmen's compensation schemes provide "not only for employees a rem
edy which is both expeditious and independent of proof of fault, but also for employ
ers a liability which is limited and determinate." Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286
U.S. 145, 159 (1932). See also Ahmed's Case, 278 Mass. 180, 179 N.E. 684 (1932).
The court held that the compensation act established a system that was to cover all
work related injuries. [d. at 183, 179 N.E. at 685.
58. See notes 41-45 supra and accompanying text.
59. 219 Mass. 420, 106 N.E. 988 (1914). See notes 22-26 supra and accompa
nying text.
60. [d. at 425, 106 N.E. at 989.
6!. [d. at 424, 106 N.E. at 989.
62. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2091, 413 N.E.2d at 699.

1981]

A.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

513

Massachusetts Law in 1911

King's analysis, however, is not as persuasive today as it was in
1914 since the actions allowed in Ferriter did not exist in 1911,
when the Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted. A child's
right to recover for loss of parental consortium was created by
Ferriter itself,63 and the right to' recovery for emotional distress
without prior physical injury was first granted in Massachusetts in
1971. 64 Further, recovery for negligently inflicted loss of spousal
consortium was not firmly established as an independent right for
either spouse until 1973. 65 When workmen's compensation was
adopted in 1911, the Massachusetts legislature undoubtedly could
not foresee that employers would be potentially liable for these ac
tions in the future. Third-party claims like the claim in King may
have been so insignificant that they were not even contemplated
by the legislature. Regardless, without legislative approval, em
ployers' liability should not exceed what it would have been in
1911 when the Workmen's Compensation Act was passed. The
Ferriter court, in allowing loss of consortium and emotional dis
tress actions, has exposed employers to liability after nearly sev
enty years of immunity from common-law actions. This result is
clearly contrary to the policy underlying workmen's compensation.
Even if the legislators inadvertently neglected to exclude
third-party actions in the 1911 Act, they may have felt that they
corrected the oversight with the passage of section 35A of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. 66 This section provides added com
pensation when an injured employee has dependents. 67 Defendant
in Ferriter argued that section 35A overruled King. 68 To prove
this, defendant introduced the King court's statement that "[t]his is
not a case where the plaintiff has taken any benefit under the act,
63. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
64. George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244,268 N.E.2d 915 (1971).
65. A spouse's right to recover for negligently inflicted loss of consortium was
firmly established in Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973).
That is, even a husband's action for negligently inflicted loss of consortium did not
exist if the wife had been fully compensated. See generally Lombardi v. Frangioso &
Co., 359 Mass. 589, 269 N.E.2d 836 (1971); Witcomb v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R.
Co., 215 Mass. 440, 102 N.E. 663 (1913); FenefT v. New York Cent. & H. R.R. Co.,
203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909).
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 35A (West Cum. Supp. 1981). See note
27 supra.
67. Id.
68. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2095,413 N.E.2d at 702. See also id. at n.27.
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which it might be contended would stop her from making any
claim. . . . "69 The King court thus admitted that receipt of com
pensation would preclude additional recovery. Since the mother in
King had received no compensation, she was not barred. In con
trast, the Act now provides compensation for dependents of injured
employees. The Ferriter majority, however, refused to hold that
section 35A made King inoperative or that it repealed any common
law rights. The court gave effect to King and allowed common
Jaw actions because the Workmen's Compensation Act included
no express language invalidating them. 70 Once again the court ig
nored the fact that the common-law rights which it recognized did
not exist in 1911.

B.

Legislative State of Mind

In enacting the Workmen's Compensation Act the legislature
intended to immunize employers from third-party actions. Sections
66 and 67 of the Act indicate such an intent. When an employee
sues an employer for personal injury, section 66 abolishes the em
ployers' common-law defenses if he has not insured himself as re
quired by the Act.71 Hence, if an uninsured employer is sued by
an injured employee, he cannot raise the defenses of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, negligence by a fellow servant, or
lack of causation. Section 67 protects employers who have secured
insurance and thus have complied with the Act but who are sued
by employees who have elected to retain the right to sue at com
mon law and have rejected workmen's compensation. 72 Section 67
makes section 66 inapplicable to actions for personal injuries if the
employer has complied with the Act. 73 The employer's common
law defenses, therefore, remain intact.
69. 219 Mass. at 423, 106 N.E. at 989.
70. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2095, 413 N.E.2d at 702.
71. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 66 (West Cum. Supp. 1981) formerly
stated:
In actions to recover damages for personal injury . . . sustained ... by an
employee in the course of his employment ... it shall not be a defense:
1. That the employee was negligent;
2. That the injury was caused by ... a fellow employee;
3. That the employee ... assumed ... the risk ... ;
4. That the employee's injury did not result from [the] ... fault of the em
ployer.

Id.
See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
73. "Section sixty-six shall not apply to actions to recover damages for personal
injuries received by employees of an insured person or a self insurer." MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 67 (West 1958).
72.
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The interrelationship of sections 66 and 67 is best illustrated
by Zarba v. Lane. 74 In Zarba an employee of a noncomplying,
uninsured employer was injured by a fellow employee in the
course of his work. The father of the injured employee sued the
employer for consequential damages. Though different from loss of
consortium and services, the court held that a cause of action for
consequential damages also was an independent right of action. 75
The suit, however, was barred. Since the father's suit was for con
sequential damages and not for personal injuries, it was not cov
ered by section 66; hence the employer's common-law defenses
were not abolished. The employer thus was able to raise the fellow
servant rule and avoid liability.
Section 66 was amended in 1971 to allow the kind of action
that was barred in Zarba. 76 Section 67, however, was not similarly
amended to include actions for consequential damages arising from
personal injuries. In actions for personal injuries or consequential
damages an uninsured employer still, correctly, does not have the
common-law defenses at his disposal. If the employer is insured
and he is sued by an employee who elected to reject workmen's
compensation, section 67 reinstates the common-law defenses, but
only in actions for personal injuries. 77 Consequential damages are
not mentioned in section 67. The father in Zarba, therefore, now
would have a cause of action; but the employer, even if he were
insured, would not be able to raise his common-law defenses. The
legislature could not have intended to make an employer who
complied with the Act defenseless against a third party suing for
consequential damages. There can be only one explanation: the
legislature must have believed that an employer who fully
complied with the Act was immune from suit. 78
74. 322 Mass. 132,76 N.E.2d 318 (1947).
75. The father's right here was identical to the mother's in King. Id. at 135, 76
N.E.2d at 320.
76. "In an action to recover damages for personal injury or consequential dam
ages sustained . . . by an employee . . . [contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, the fellow servant rule, or the employer's exercise of reasonable care] shall not
be a defense . . . ." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 66 (West Cum. Supp. 1981).
The comment to that amendment states that it establishes "a right of action for con
sequential damages ... where a minor child or spouse in the course. of his employ
ment sustains a personal injury.... Id. (Comment by James Smith). The amendment
became necessary after cases like Zarba had interpreted § 66 as giving no right of ac
tion for consequential damages.
77. See note 73 supra.
78. It would be interesting to see how the supreme judicial court would rule if
presented with this question. To prevent any unfair results, the court probably
would read § 67 as implicitly including actions for consequential damages.
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Prior Suprerne Judicial Court Policy

In Ferriter the court imposed liability on employers who oth
erwise had been immune from suit for nearly seventy years. JUlitice
Quirico, in his dissent, stated that the majority's decision in effect
amended the statute and therefore usurped the legislature's
power. 79 Ferriter represents a clear departure from prior court pol
icy. In the past the court has been deferential to the legislature
and hesitant to intrude upon its domain. For example, the court re
fused to disturb workmen's compensation law to accommodate
changes in products liability law. In Longever v. Revere Copper &
Brass Inc. 8o an employee was injured by a defective machine that
was manufactured and marketed by a separate division of the com
pany employing him. The plaintiff's theory of liability was that his
employer, which manufactured a product introduced into the
stream of commerce, owed him a duty separate from that arising
out of the employment relationship.81 The court disallowed the suit
on the basis of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Neither the re
cent expansion of products liability recovery nor the fact that the
defective manufacturing issue was separate from the employer
employee relationship persuaded the justices. The court concluded
that changes in the statutory scheme, needed because of shifts in
societal values, .are matters of concern for the legislature. 82
Another example of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's deference to the legislature is found in Liberty Mutual In
surance Co. v. Westerlind. 83 The court did not allow a third-party
tort-feasor to implead an injured employee's allegedly negligent

79. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2106-07, 413 N.E.2d at 708 (Quirico, J., dissenting).
Justice Quirico states that he finds it very interesting that no Massachusetts case has
ever reached the same result as King v. Viscoloid in the 66 years that have passed
since the decision was handed down. Id. at 2105 n.3, 413 N.E.2d at 707 n.3.
80. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1767, 408 N.E.2d 857. See also Matthews v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 354 Mass. 470, 238 N.E.2d 348 (1968) (wife's suit against insurance
company for negligent failure to inspect working conditions held barred by act.)
81. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1768, 408 N.E.2d at 858-59. This is the so-called
dual capacity doctrine. Under this theory "an employer normally shielded from tort
liability by the exclusive remedy principle may become liable in tort to his own em
ployee if he occupies . . . a second capacity that confers on him obligations inde
pendent of those imposed on him as employer." A. LARSON, supra note 37, §§ 72,
80, at 14-12. See generally Comment, Manufacturers Liability as a Dual Capacity of
an Employer, 12 AKRON L. REV. 747 (1979); Note, Dual Capacity Doctrine: Third
Party Liability of Employer-Manufacturer in Product Liability Litigation, 12 IND. L.
REV. 533 (1979).
82. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1772,409 N.E.2d at 860.
83. 374 Mass. 524, 373 N.E.2d 957 (1978).
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employer for contribution even though contribution is an inde
pendent right. 84 The court reasoned that the person sought to be
impleaded, the employer, had to be liable to suit by the injured
party, the employee. Since the employee was barred from suing
his employer by section 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act,
the third-party tort-feasor could not sue for contribution. 85 The
employee's foneiture of his common-law rights under section 24
also barred the employer from seeking contribution. King and
Ferriter clearly are at odds with this logic: they rely on the maxim
that a person's common-law rights will not be held to be waived or
abrogated unless this intent is expressed clearly in a statute. In
Westerlind" the court again noted the inherent unfairness in
denying a third party the right to sue an injured individual's em
ployer but stated that, no matter how compelling policies might
appear, any change in the law must come from the legislature. 86 In
Ferriter the court allowed suit to be brought by an employee's
family even though the claim arose from an injury that would not
have been actionable by the employee. 87 This result clearly is con
trary to Westerlind and Longever, which both held that any expan
sion or restriction of the Act's coverage was to be initiated by. the
84. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, § l(a) (West Cum. Supp. 1981):
H[W]here two or more persons become jointly liable ... for the same injury ... there
shall be a right of contribution...."
85. 374 Mass. at 526-27,373 N.E.2d at 959.
86. [d. at 527, 373 N.E.2d at 959.
87. The Ferriter court, when confronted with Westerlind, tried to limit it to its
facts. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2096 n.28, 413 N.E.2d at 702 n.28. Contribution was
was disallowed because the party sought to be impleaded, the employer, had to be ame
nable to suit by the plaintiff, the employee. The employer in Westerlind was not ame
nable to suit because of the exclusivity·clause of the compensation act. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 24 (West 1958). In consortium actions, the person being sued
must also be amenable to suit by the person who initially suffered injury. If the ini
tially injured person cannot sue the tortfeasor, neither can the person suing for loss
of consortium. Gardner v. Boston Elevated Ry., 204 Mass. 213, 90 N.E. 534 (1910).
See generally 36 A.L.R.3d 900, 907 (1971). In Ferriter, the employer similarly could
not be sued by the injured employee. See also New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co.
v. Maritime Terminal, Inc., 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1319,405 N.E.2d 653. The inherent
unfairness in such a situation is quite evident. A third-party tortfeasor might be only
10% at fault yet be responsible for the entire judgment, while an employer who is
90% at fault would be immune from suit. Other states have reached a more equitable
solution to this problem. The leading case is Dole v. Dow Chern. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143,
282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1972). See generally A. LARSON supra note 37, §§
76.01-76.20, at 14-287-14-295; Note, Employer Liability to Third-Parties Under The
Workmen's Compensation and Comparative Negligence Statutes, 26 U. KAN. L. REV.
485 (1978); Note, Workers' Compensation-Exclusivity Provisions of the Worker's
Compensation Act as a Bar to Third-Party Actions Against Employers, 14 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 587 (1979).
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legislature. In Ferriter the court legislated by exposing the em
ployer to liability for new causes of action.
D.

Peculiarity of Section 24

Workmen's compensation exclusivity clauses can be classified
into three categories: The narrow Massachusetts type;88 the inter
mediate California type;89 and the broad New York type. 90 The
wording of the different statutes has caused much controversy and
has prompted litigation in many states. Ferriter conflicts with the
decisions reached by most state courts that have considered
third-party actions. 91 For example, in Danek v. Hammer 92 the
New Jersey Supreme Court considered an exclusivity clause similar
to section 24. 93 The New Jersey court held that an action for loss of
consortium was barred because workmen's compensation was a
complete substitute for tort law in the area of work-related law
88. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 152, § 24 (West 1958) only says that "an em
ployee shall be held to have waived his right of action at common law...." (empha
sis added). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (West 1979).
89. California's exclusivity clause states that compensation under the act is "the
exclusive remedy ... against the employer." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Cum.
Supp. 1980). States with similarly worded exclusivity clause-s are: Kansas (KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-501 (West Cum. Supp. 1973)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:15-8 (West Cum. Supp. 1980)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08
(1960)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1973)); Washington (WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 51.04.010 (West Cum. Supp. 1981)); West Virginia (W. VA. CODE
§ 23-2-6 (1978)); Wisconsin (WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.03 (West Cum. Supp. 1980)).
90. New York's exclusivity clause states: "The liability of an employer ... shall
be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever, to such employee, his
personal representatives, spouse, parents, dependents or next of kin ... [who are]
entitled to recover . . . at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or
death. . . ." N.Y. [WORK. COMP.] LAw § Ii (McKinney Cum. Supp. 1980). Other
states with this type of exclusivity clauses are: Florida (FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.11
(West Supp. 1967-80)); Georgia (GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (Cum. Supp. 1980)); Illi
nois (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.4(g) (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1980-81)); Indiana
(IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-6 (Bums 1974)); Iowa (IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.20 (West
Cum. Supp. 1980-81)); Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.690 (1980)); Louisiana
(LA. REV. STA. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-81)); Michigan (MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 418.131 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-81)); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. ANN. §
176.061 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-81)); Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 12
(West 1970)); Oregon (OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018 (1979)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE
ANN. § 50-908 (1977)). See also Longshoremen's & Harborworkers' Compensation
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976).
91. See note 95 supra.
92. 14 N.J. Super. 607, 82 A.2d 659 (1951), afrd, 9 N.J. 56,87 A.2d 5 (1952).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Cum. Supp. 1980). This statute was
amended in 1961 and is now similar to the California statute. CAL. LAB. CODE §
3601 (West Cum. Supp. 1980).
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suits. 94 States with broader exclusivity clauses, like those enacted
in New York and California, also have consistently barred such,
third-party actions. 95 The majority in Ferriter was not swayed by
other states' disposition of the third-party liability issue. Section 24
limits waiver of common-law rights to employees only. This aspect
of section 24 was held to distinguish the Massachusetts Workmen's
Compensation Act's exclusivity clause from exclusivity clauses en
acted in other states. 96
Section 24, however, may not be as unique as the court claims
it is. Neither the King nor the Ferriter court included section 23 of
the Act in its analysis. 97 Section 23 releases employers from "all
claims or demands at law, if any, arising from the injury [if the em
ployee accepts compensation under the Act]. "98 Releasing the em
ployer from all claims arising from the injury is equivalent to pro
viding the employee with an exclusive remedy against the
94. 9 N.J. 56 at 60-61, 87 A.2d at 7-8. The court decided that characterizing the
right of consortium upon which the plaintiff sued as an independent right was irrel
evant in light of the purpose of workmen's compensation. Id. at 60, 87 A.2d at 7. See
notes 111-13 infra and accompanying text.
95. The states with the California intermediate statute have disallowed third
party actions based on the policy considerations underlying workmen's compensation
statutes. For a list of these states, see note 89 supra. See, e.g., Casaccia v. Green Val
ley Disposal Co., 62 Cal. App. 3d 610, 133 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1976) (recent recognition
of a wife's independent right for loss of consortium is irrelevant); Williams v.
Schwartz, 61 Cal. App. 3d 628, 131 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1976) (statute evinces an
unmistakable legislative policy that workmen's compensation benefits are to be the
sole remedy); Bevis v. Armco Steel Corp., 156 Ohio St. 295, 102 N.E.2d 444 (1951)
(policy of workmen's compensation bars the wife's independent claim); West v.
Zeibell, 87 Wash. 2d 198, 550 P.2d 522 (1976) (existence of an independent right of
action is of no significance). But see Pedrazza v. Sid Fleming Contractor, Inc., 94 .
N.M. 59, 607 P.2d 597 (1980) (common-law action might not be barred because em
ployee's wife is a nonresident alien and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the
state's compensat!on act). See also Johnson v. Lohre, 508 S.W.2d 785 (Ky. Ct. App.
1974) (wife's action against husband's fellow employee held not barred because it is
independent). The statute in Lohre, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.015(1) (1956), was re
placed in 1973 by Ky. REV: STAT. ANN. § 342.690 (1980), which is similar to the
broad New York type of exclusivity clause. Statutes following the New York Model
are set out in note 90 supra. Courts construing the New York type of statute have
had a relatively easy time barring actions like the one in Ferriter because of the
strict wording of the statutes. See Haddad v. Justice, 64 Mich. App. 74, 235 N.W.2d
159 (1975); Swan v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 129 Misc. 500, 222 N.Y.S. 111 (Sup. Ct.
1927). The underlying policy of workmen's compensation has been relied upon as
well to bar these actions. See Bloemer v. Square D Co., 8 Ill. App. 3d 371, 290
N.E.2d 699 (1972); Ellis v. Fallert, 209 Or. 406, 307 P.2d 283 (1957); Ro~encrans v.
Wisconsin Tel. Co., 54 Wis. 2d 124, 194 N.W.2d 643 (1972).
96. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2092-93, 413 N.E.2d at 700.
97. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 4 supra.

520

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:503

employer. This is precisely what California's exclusivity clause pro
vides. 99 It would appear, therefore, that the Massachusetts Work
men's Compensation Act is not as unique as the Ferriter court
claimed.
Section 23 probably was ignored because it had never been
used before in the context of third-party claims. It has been dis
cussed only in relation to suits between employers and employees.
Releasing the employer from claims arising from the injury, then,
has meant the release of all claims an employee might have. The
section's main purpose is to prevent double recovery by the em
ployee. 100 The Massachusetts courts, however, have recognized
that section 23 also was meant to protect employers from double li
ability.101 An argument could be made, therefore, that when sec
tion 23 applies, that is, when the employee accepts compensation
under the Act, the employer is to be released from all claims, no
matter who brings them. The King court did not consider section
23 in its decision though, by its terms, that section seems applicable.
The Ferriter court, in adhering strictly to King, similarly failed to
consider the full reach of section 23. By ignoring section 23 and
concentrating only on section 24 the Ferriter court was able to dis
tinguish the Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act from the
compensation acts enacted in other jurisdictions. 102
If the Ferriter court's reasoning was correct in allowing causes
of action like loss of consortium despite the existence of the com
pensation statute, then it would follow that the courts of the other
states have reached incorrect conclusions. According to Ferriter, if
an employer has committed a tort against an employee's wife or
child, it is immaterial that workmen's compensation exists. The
wife or child should be able to recover. The courts in the rest of
the country, however, disagree with this notion. Negligently in
99. See note 89 supra.
100. In re West, 313 Mass. 146, 153-54,46 N.E.2d 760, 765; McDonald v. Em
ployers' Liability Assurance Corp., 288 Mass. 170, 174, 192 N.E.2d 608, 609-10 .
. 101. 313 Mass. 146, 153-55,46 N.E.2d 760, 765 (1943).
102. The majority claims that the legislature's rejection in 1911 of a draft work
men's compensation act supports its interpretation. The draft contained the following
exclusivity clause: "The right to compensation ... shall be in lieu of all rights and
remedies now in existence ... and such rights and remedies shall not accrue to em
ployees entitled to compensation." 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2092 n.20, 413 N.E.2d at
700 n.20. This argument is weak for two reasons. First, there is no proof that the en
tire draft was rejected because of this clause. Furthermore, the wording of this clause
embodies the policies underlying §§ 23 and 24 of chapter 152: A rejection of double
recovery for the employee and an exclusive remedy against the employer. See notes
100-01 supra and accompanying text.
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flicted loss of consortium does not arise from a breach of duty
solely toward a wife or child of an injured employee. loa Rather,
loss of consortium is a tort which arises out of another injury,
which in this case happens to be a work-related injury.
When an employer has committed a tort directly against an
employee's dependents and the tort is separate from the initial in
jury to the employee, however, some courts have allowed suit to
be brought by the injured parties. Employees' dependents have
been allowed to sue employers in several situations: When the em
ployer sent the bloody body of an injured employee home to his
pregnant wife, causing shock and miscarriage;l04 when the em
ployer allowed a deceased employee's remains to be mutilated;105
and when the employer contributed to the alcoholism of the em
ployee. los In each of these cases the employer committed a tort
against the plaintiff that was separate from the initial injury to
the employee, unlike the harm Ferriter's wife and children suf
fered. The damage they sustained, though separate from Ferriter's
injury, arose out of Ferriter's work-related injury. Workmen's com
pensation was created to replace the common law for this kind of
work-related tort.
The majority in Ferriter apparently disregarded the experi
ence the New Hampshire Supreme Court and legislature had with
this same issue. Before 1971 the New Hampshire Workmen's Com
pensation Act had an exclusivity clause similar to section 24. 107 The
New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted this statute to allow
husbands and wives to bring the kinds of actions recognized in
Ferriter, loss of consortium and negligent infliction of emotional
distress. lOS The exclusivity clause was amended in 1971 109 to bar
such actions, apparently in anticipation of the enormous amount of

103. See A. LARSON, supra note 45, § 66.30, at 12-28.
104. Price v. Yellow Pine Paper Mill Co., 240 S.W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
(action by wife).
105. Diebler v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 196 Misc. 618,
92 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1949) (action by children of deceased employee).
106. Shell Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 213 Cal. 596, 2 P.2d 801 (1931) (action by
spouse and children).
107. "An employee ... shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the
provisions hereof and to have waived his rights of action at common law ... against
his employer" for personal injuries. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:12 (1977).
108. American Asbestos Textile Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 114
N.H. 806, 330 A.2d 451 (1974); LaBonte v. National Gypsum Co., llO N.H. 314, 269
A.2d 634 (1970).
109. 1971 N.H. LAWS ch. 539:5.
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litigation that was sure to result from the court's decision. 11o The
New Hampshire Supreme Court thus was legislatively overruled
because it failed to grasp the intent of the legislature 111 and failed
to promote the policy of workmen's compensation. 112 Massa
chusetts' high court, by following precisely the same path, has
risked a similar legislative overruling.
V.

IMPACT OF FERRITER

Ferriter will return work-related torts to the courtroom, con
trary to the purpose of workmen's compensation. 113 Justice Quirico
stated in his dissent that "it is not enough to determine whether
the legal theories can be extended to cover the cases before us.
The question is whether they should be. "114 In work-related injury
cases no one benefits. Lawsuits generate bad feelings between
management and labor and impose tremendous costs on both sides.
The main results of litigation are not large awards to the injured,
but increased costs to the system and wasted court time. 115 Work
related lawsuits, whether they are brought by employees or by
third parties, only increase the burden on an already overburdened
system. 116
In the past decade, Massachusetts has significantly increased
the benefits and protections provided to injured employees and
their families. 117 Industry bears the initial cost, but the increased
1l0. See O'Keefe v. Associated Grocers of New England, 117 N.H. 132, 134,
370 A.2d 261, 262-63 (1977) (citing N.H.S. Journal 2004 (1971)). The 1971 amend
ment added a sentence to N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:2 (1978) which stated that a
spouse of an employee could not bring a common-law action against the employer.
Loss of consortium for a wife, however, was not a common-law action. This technical
error soon came to light and was amended by replacing "common-law" with "no di
rect right of action."
lli. Id. 1973 N.H. LAWS ch. 481:3.
112. See text accompanying notes 37-52 supra. The act was further amended in
1978 to include "any other person who might otherwise ... recover damages ... at
common law or . . . otherwise. . . ." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:12 (1978).
Ransmeier v. Camp Cody, Inc., 117 N.H. 736, 378 A.2d 752 (1977) (administrator of
deceased employee's estate held not barred from bringing suit) probably prompted
this amendment.
113. See text accompanying notes 41-45 supra.
114. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2107, 413 N.E.2d at 703.
115. See O'Connell, Bargaining for Waivers of Third-Party Tort Claims: An
Answer to Product Liability Woes for Employers and Their Employees and Suppli
ers, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 435. This article discusses the costs that the economy incurs as
a result of employees suing third-party manufacturers. The author's concerns are ap
plicable in the context of third parties suing employers.
116. Id.
117. For example, the amendments to MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 33,34, 34A,
35 and 36.
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expenses are passed on to the consuming public. Society in general
ultimately supports workmen's compensation. Nationwide work
men's compensation costs have grown at over twice the rate of the
increase in the consumer price index and national disposable in
come. 11S Actions like those allowed in Ferriter impose liability on
industry above and beyond the strict liability it already incurs un
der workmen's compensation. This additional liability will only
work a greater economic detriment to labor, industry, and society
as a whole. 119
Remedies in work-related injury cases should be provided
through the statutory scheme devised seventy years ago for the
benefit of all. The tort system was replaced by workmen's compen
sation because the former was an inefficient and unjust method of
compensating individuals who suffered work-related injuries. The
tort system should not be resurrected unless workmen's compensa
tion proves to be a greater evil. 12o One puzzled commentator la
ments that he cannot understand why the tort system, "which is
such a monster of insensitivity when it is replaced by workers'
compensation, becomes so morally upright and desirable when it
supplements workers' compensation. "121 The answer is obvious:

U8. The cost that workmen's compensation imposes on society is by no means
insignificant. Some national statistics should be enlightening. Between 1971 and
1978, benefits for permanent total disability increased at a rate of 141 %, twice the in
crease of the Consumer Price Index (62%), and twice the increase in spendable earn
ings (65%). Statement of the Alliance of Am. Insurers Nat'l Workmen's Camp.
Standards Act of 1979: Hearings on S.42'o before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 261, 296 (1979). In 1979, it was estimated
that the 1980 workmen's compensation costs per employee would rise 851% over
the 1970 level while wages per employer would rise only 124%. Id. at 715, 734
(statement of the Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs.). For a general overview of the workmen's com
pensation systems in this country, see de Leon, Workers' Compensation: A Legal
System in Jeopardy, 29 FED'N INS. COUN. Q. 337 (1979).
U9. Justice Quirico cited some dismal statistics. In 1979, there were 249,404
work-related injuries in Massachusetts. Of these, 14,217 cases were completed; 6,880
lump sum settlements were approved under Mass. Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 152, § 48;
and $73,515,218 was paid out in benefits. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2108, 413 N.E.2d at
708 (citing Ann. Rep. of the Division of Industrial Accidents (1979».
Ironically, when Ferriter was decided a statewide business promotion campaign
was in existence entitled "Make it in Massachusetts." The Ferriter decision might
not only keep new businesses out, it may drive existing ones, especially small ones,
out.
120. It is conceded that workmen's compensation is not the panacea it w1i~'in
tended to be, but it is a tremendous improvement over the tort system. See REP. OF
THE NAT'L COMM'N ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 119 established
pursuant to the Occupational Safety and Hazards Act, 29 V.S.C. § 676 (1976).
121. O'Connell, supra note 115, at 452-53 (emphasis in original). See also
Egner, Personal Injury Awards and Workmen's Compensation, 18 V.W. ONT. L.
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once compensation is assured under the Act, the risks of the com
mon law are worth taking.
The Ferriter court refused to consider the effect its decision
might have on industry, inflation, and the economy, not to mention
small business. The maladies that workmen's compensation was
meant to remedy were not thoughtfully considered. The court de
cided that any hardships employers might face as a result of Ferriter
could be remedied by additional insurance. 122 Therefore, in addi
tion to insurance for products liability and workmen's compensation,
employers now will have to insure themselves against potential suits
for loss of consortium, emotional distress, and any other kind of
third-party action that eventually may come into being.
VI.

SUGGESTIONS

The Massachusetts legislature might overrule Ferriter by re
wording section 23 or section 24 to bar third-party claims against
employers. By doing this the legislature would align Massachusetts
with the majority of jurisdictions. Massachusetts' recent increase in
benefits, coupled with an inflationary economy, probably will
prompt the legislature to overrule Ferriter before it causes an addi
tional financial drain on industry and society.
If the legislature does choose to disallow third-party claims in
the workmen's compensation setting, it should amend the Act to
incorporate the new causes of action and provide some sort of com
pensation, just as it amended the state's wrongful death statute to
include compensation for loss of consortium. 123 Strict adherence to
the original provisions of the Act is not necessarily desirable. When
the need for compensating a new kind of harm arises, a remedy
should be provided. When this remedy has to fit within an existing
statutory scheme like workmen's compensation, however, a careful
balance must be struck by weighing all rights and interests in
volved. Clearly, this is a legislative function. 124
REV. 269 (1978). The concept of fault seems inappropriate in an advanced industrial
society as a means of determining compensation. [d. at 271.
122. 1980Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2092, n.19, 413 N.E.2d at 700, n.19.
123. See O'Connell, supra note 100, at 435.
124.
The unwritten law possesses capacity for growth; and has often satisfied
new demands for justice by invoking analogies or by expanding a rule or
principle.... [blut with the increasing complexity of society, the public in
terest tends to become omnipresent; and the problems presented by the
new demands for justice cease to be simple. Then the creation or recogni
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If the legislature chooses not to act, it is the duty of the courts

to reconcile the comp'eting interests involved. 125 The courts must
not ignore the economic consequences of Ferriter. In 1979 there
were approximately 250,000 work-related injuries in Massa
chusetts. 126 The number of consortium actions brought by spouses
or children could be tremendous. To minimize the potential eco
nomic harm, actions for emotional distress should be defined care
fully and should be restricted to prevent unlimited liability.127 The
value of someone's consortium should be quantified. In this way it
can be treated as a determinative and actuarially predictable cost of
doing business and thus should not work too great a burden on
employers.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Workmen's compensation was enacted to benefit both employ
ees and employers. Employees were given limited but assured
compensation for their injuries. Employers benefited because their
liability was both limited and predictable so that it could be treated
as a cost of production. In Ferriter, however, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court demonstrated that employers in Massa
chusetts gained very little under the Massachusetts Workmen's
Compensation Act. Employers are not immune from suit by third
parties for loss of consortium or for infliction of emotional distress,
even when the harm arises from an injury to an employee. This
decision, which is contrary to the law in most states, was based
primarily on the narrow wording of the exclusivity clause of the
Massachusetts Workmen's Compensation Act, which states that
employees waive only their own common-law rights. The rights of
Ferriter's spouse and children, therefore, were held to be pre
served.
tion by courts of a new private right may work serious injury to the general
public, unless the boundaries of the right are definitely established and
wisely guarded. [When so many rights and interests need to be balanced,
the legislature is the one that should act.]
International New Servo v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 262-63 (Brandeis, J. dis
senting).
125. In Liberty Mut. Ins. CO. V. Westerlind, 374 Mass. 524, 373 N.E.2d 957
(1978) and. New Bedford Gas & Edison Light Co. v. Marine Terminal, Inc., 1980
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1319,405 N.E.2d 653, notes 110-113 supra, the court hinted that if an
express contract to indemnify or contribute existed, the action might be allowed. The
Ferriter decision recognizing certain third party actions as independent of the work
shop is analogous support for this proposition.
126. See note 119 supra.
127. See note 6 supra.
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This decision most likely will lead to a flood of lawsuits based
on derivative claims brought by families of injured employees. The
costs that industry and society as a whole will incur can be ex
pected to be very high unless the legislature acts to limit the ef
fects of this decision.
Robert A. F ourniadis

